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Storage and Supports 
Have Worked, BUT ... 
. . . what would have happened without them 
in the 1952-58 period? Farm prices and incomes 
would have dropped, say these authors. With-
holding grain did have the effect of raising prices 
and incomes in this period. But is it possible we 
have only borrowed this increase from the future? 
by Geoffrey Shepherd, Francis Kutish, Don Kaldor, 
Richard Heifner and Arnold Paulsen 
T HE LARGE STOCKS of feed grains that have been accu-
mulating in CCC storage in recent 
years have grown still larger in 
1959. The farming industry seems 
to have a bear by the tail, and it 
doesn't quite know how to let go 
-or what would happen if it did. 
Questions are being raised 
about whether farmers might not 
have been better off if there had 
not been a loan and storage pro-
gram for feed grains in the first 
place-and whether the program 
should be ended and prices re-
turned to the free market. 
Main interest, of course, cen-
ters on the possible effects on 
prices and farm income in the ab-
sence of such a program. What 
would have happened, for exam-
ple, to farm income and livestock 
prices if feed grain price supports 
had been enough lower so that 
feed grain carryover wouldn't 
have grown any larger after 19 5 2? 
Intensified research by the Ex-
periment Station and the Center 
for Agricultural and Economic 
Adjustment at Iowa State throws 
some light on this question. 
Let's look at this question in 
three steps: ( 1) How much would 
livestock production have in-
creased if the large amounts of 
corn and other feed grains that 
went into storage during 1952-58 
had been fed to livestock instead? 
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( 2) How much lower would live-
stock prices have had to be to in-
duce consumers to eat the larger 
supplies of meat, milk and eggs? 
( 3) What would have happened 
to farm income from livestock as 
a result of the lower prices? 
Grain, Livestock Effects • • 
Each year from 1952 to 1958, 
from 4 to 10 million tons of feed 
grains were added to the carry-
over. These amounts-averaging 
6.3 percent of the total annual 
consumption by livestock-went 
into storage, rather than into live-
stock. 
What would have happened if 
this additional amount had been 
fed to livestock each year? All 
classes of livestock wouldn't have 
been able to increase consumption 
of feed grains by the same per-
centage. Production of some kinds 
of livestock is more easily ex-
panded than others. Also, feed 
grains make up a different per-
centage of the total feed for each 
kind of livestock. 
Our judgment is that the in-
crease in the supply of beef cattle 
in response to more and lower-
priced feed grains over the past 
7 years would have been small. 
Among other factors, feed grains 
make up a small proportion of 
the total feed required for the 
nation's beef herd, and the supply 
of rangeland where most beef cat-
tle are produced is relatively fixed. 
Still, we estimated that 15 percent 
of the average annual surplus 
would be used for beef cattle. 
The situation would have been 
different for hogs, broilers and 
turkeys. Numbers of hogs and 
turkeys could be increased within 
a year; broilers, in about 3 
months. Feed grains make up a 
large proportion of the total ra-
tion for hogs and poultry, so more 
and cheaper feed grains would 
quickly stimulate production. It's 
likely, therefore, that a large share 
of the increase in consumption of 
feed grains would have gone into 
hogs, broilers and turkeys. 
Generally, the prices of all 
livestock and livestock products 
would have been lower from 1952 
to 1958 if we had fed our feed 
grain stocks. Though total beef 
consumption, for example, would 
have had to increase only 1 per-
cent-or less than a pound per 
person-to use up the increased 
supply, cattle prices would have 
been about 5 percent lower. This 
is mainly because pork supplies 
would have been substantially 
larger. Beef prices would have 
declined to prevent a reduced 
beef consumption because of a 
substitution of pork for beef. 
Pork prices would have dropped 
almost 19 percent-mainly be-
cause the supply of pork would 
have increased sharply, nearly 
7 0 percent. Egg and poultry 
prices would have dropped about 
13 percent, mostly because all 
meats would have been in larger 
supply and cheaper than usual. 
Poultry and eggs seem to be "fill-
in" foods for red meat, and their 
prices drop sharply when all meat 
supplies increase. 
The estimated drop in total in-
come from the sale of livestock 
and livestock products would have 
been slightly over 6 percent. But 
since production would have in-
creased, gross income wouldn't 
have been reduced as much as 
the prices. 
Add in Wheat • 
So far, we've considered only 
feed grains. But it's likely that, 
if we hadn't permitted the stocks 
of feed grains to increase, we 
wouldn't have permitted wheat 
stocks to increase either. If, in 
other words, we'd put all of the 
current production of feed grains 
on the market during 1952-1958, 
we'd have done the same thing 
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for wheat. In that case, the price 
of wheat would have fallen to 
feed grain levels, and large quan-
tities of wheat would have been 
used for this purpose. 
Most of the extra wheat would 
have been fed to livestock. The 
demand for wheat for human food 
doesn't change much, and hardly 
any more would have been used 
for human food in the United 
States, even at very low prices. 
Also, if we had cut the price of 
wheat in foreign markets, Can-
ada, Argentina and Australia 
probably would have matched our 
price cuts. Thus, we'd have sold 
only a little more abroad. 
For practical purposes, adding 
the net additions to wheat storage 
during 1952-58 to the 6.3-percent 
increase in feed grains would 
have meant that consumption by 
livestock would have been 10.3 
percent larger than it actually 
was. 
Hog production then would have 
been about 12 percent larger; 
poultry production, about 10 per-
cent larger. The nation's farms 
had the capacity to produce this 
volume of livestock production 
without difficulty. But the total 
value of the larger pig crops 
would have been about 22 percent 
lower than the value of the 
smaller pig crops that actually 
were marketed in 1952-1958. The 
total value of all livestock pro-
duction would have been reduced 
about 100 percent. 
Is This the Case? 
The estimates we've just out-
lined are based on the assumption 
that production of feed grains 
and wheat wouldn't have changed 
much in response to the lower 
prices and incomes that would 
have resulted from the higher 
rates of feed consumption. 
Some observers, however, dis-
agree with this assumption. Some 
say that lower feed grains and 
wheat prices would have reduced 
their production - that farmers 
would have produced less in re-
sponse to lower prices. Others 
say, though, that it would have 
increased production-that farm-
ers would have produced more in 
an attempt to offset the lower 
prices. 
Our own belief is that, over the 
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period as a whole, some initial 
changes in production would have 
taken place as feed grain and 
wheat prices declined and as pro-
ducers shifted some acreage to 
competing crops. But this shift 
to other crops would quickly have 
reduced their prices, too. So the 
prices of most farin products 
would have been reduced in 
roughly similar proportions. Un-
der these conditions-since there's 
not much "give" in total acreage 
-we believe that total feed grains 
and wheat production wouldn't 
have changed much either way. 
lnc:ome Changes • • . 
As indicated earlier, livestock 
prices would have been lower if 
we'd fed the stocks of wheat and 
feed grains accumulated during 
1952-1958. To bring about in-
creased livestock feeding and pro-
duction (with consequently lower 
livestock prices), feed grain prices 
would have had to be about 24 
percent lower than they were. 
Corn prices would have averaged 
about $1 rather than $1.32 per 
bushel. Wheat prices would have 
dropped to a level about 10 per-
cent higher than feed grains, or 
from $1.98 to $1.11 per bushel. 
Lower grain prices would have 
reduced the incomes of farmers 
selling grain and reduced the costs 
of farmers buying grain. Some 
who normally sell feed grains 
would have fed the grains instead. 
Many specialized wheat farmers 
would have continued to produce 
wheat for sale, however, and a 
large proportion would have been 
sold off the farm. Thus, the ef-
fects on income would have been 
vastly different between farms in 
the Great Plains and farms in the 
Corn Belt, as well as between 
cash-grain farmers and livestock 
farmers. 
From the standpoint of income 
from both livestock and feed 
grains, we estimate that net farm 
income would have dropped about 
33 percent from what it was dur-
ing the 1952-58 period. Cash re-
ceipts from livestock made up 54 
percent of total cash receipts in 
agriculture during this period. 
Production in this large sector of 
agriculture would have expanded 
in volume--but the value of this 
production would have decreased 
in absolute terms if we'd fed the 
stocks. Income from feed and 
food grains would have decreased 
sharply, and this would have con-
tributed almost as much to the 
decline in cash receipts as would 
livestock. Total cash receipts 
would have averaged about 3 0 
billion dollars less during the pe-
riod. 
Cash expenses would have re-
mained about constant during 
1952-58 if we had fed, rather than 
accumulated, stocks. Increased 
livestock volume would have in-
creased the cost of purchased feed. 
But lower livestock prices would 
have reduced the cost of pur-
chased livestock. The net change 
in total cash expenditures might 
have been about 1 percent. 
Though receipts would have 
declined about 110 percent-and 
costs by 1 percent-net income 
would have declined 33 percent. 
Net income is quite vulnerable 
to changes in gross income; costs 
tend to remain steady, so net in-
come then must absorb all of the 
change in gross income. 
The Future? 
There's a danger in assuming 
that the higher prices and in-
comes that resulted from storage 
and price supports being set above 
long-run equilibrium levels dur-
ing 1952-58 are all net gain. With 
the possible exception of some 
satellites, what goes up must 
come down. 
Withholding large quantities of 
grains from the market raised 
prices and incomes while the 
stocks were accumulating. But 
stocks can't go on increasing for-
ever. Sooner or later, they'll reach 
the limit of public support. If the 
public begins to believe that agri-
culture - and the nation as a 
whole--may get more for its 
money spent in other ways, and 
acts on that belief, the size of the 
stocks will begin to decline. 
Presumably, the decline in the 
stocks will depress prices and in-
comes by just about as much as 
the accumulation of the stocks 
raised them in the first place. In 
effect, the 1952-58 increase in in-
come may only have been bor-
rowed from the future, and, in 
one way or another, it may have 
to be paid back. 
